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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of the hegemon in the international response to genocide. The study 
looks specifically at the role of the United States and the post Cold War cases of genocide to 
determine how the United States encouraged or discouraged a response to genocide. By using the 
plausibility probe method, this study finds that the role of the hegemon is an important one that 
should be studied further to understand the impact of the hegemon on the international response 
to genocide. 
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After the world witnessed the horrors of the Holocaust the international community cried 
out “never again” and resolved to find ways to discourage the repression of citizens by their 
governments and to prevent the atrocities like those that resulted from the Holocaust. The 
violence of the Holocaust seemed so different from anything the world had seen before that the 
actions seemed to merit a new term: genocide. Even though destructions of this kind have been 
perpetrated throughout history, the Holocaust was an important turning point when states 
responded collectively to declare that acts of such monstrosity were unacceptable and against 
international moral standards. Leaders from around the world created the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (from here on referred to as the Genocide 
Convention or simply the Convention) and declared it in force as of January 12, 1951. Not only 
is genocide declared a “crime under international law,” but it is also considered so grievously 
against the international norms that the agreement requires signing states to do all within their 
power to prevent genocide from occurring.  
Although the Genocide Convention requires states to prevent and punish genocide, there 
have been multiple cases when the international community failed to respond. Many 
explanations have been given for this failure, but there has not yet been a theorization of the 
causes behind the inability of the Genocide Convention and its signatories to prevent and punish 
genocide when it occurs. The recurring cases of genocide and the current situation in Darfur, 
Sudan raises the question, why has the international community failed to prevent genocide?  
In order to examine the failure of the international community to prevent genocide, I will 
focus specifically on the leadership role of the hegemon and its actions to encourage or 
discourage the rest of the international community to respond to genocide. The leadership 
potential of the hegemon and other major powers in the international community and 
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international crises is vast. Major powers provide humanitarian aid, generate economic policies 
that affect worldwide trade, have the ability to take military action and set the example for the 
reaction of the international community towards crises. The importance of a willing hegemon 
and major powers to be involved in the international community, regardless of the size of the 
country affected, is not only important, but often is essential. This thesis argues that the decision 
of the hegemon to respond to genocide will encourage the rest of the international community to 
respond and is therefore required to stop the genocide. In order to examine this further, this thesis 
will focus specifically on the role of the United States in the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda 
and will look at the impact of the hegemon on the cessation of genocide. 
 The thesis is organized as follows. The first section explains the definition of genocide, 
the Genocide Convention, and the extent of the problem of states failing to enforce the 
Convention. The second section explores the literature on hegemony, collective security, and the 
Genocide Convention and draws the theoretical basis for the project from the literatures. The use 
of multiple literatures provides the best foundation to develop possible reasons or hypotheses for 
the failure of the Genocide Convention. Finally, I will discuss the role of the hegemon in 
responding to genocide and demonstrate the connection between the leadership of the hegemon 
and the presence or absence of a response towards genocide. 
 
The Genocide Convention: Background and Ratification 
 Although the word “genocide” is known by the majority of people in the world, the word 
itself is in fact a new concept. Until the Holocaust, the mass killing of a group of people based on 
their intrinsic characteristics was labeled barbarity, not genocide (Power 2002). A Polish jurist 
named Raphael Lemkin, who had studied the repeated occurrences of genocide throughout 
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history, coined the word “genocide” to truly reflect the “unique horror of the crime”. Lemkin 
also understood the need to draft a document that mandated political leaders to act on the “moral 
imperative” of stopping genocide (Power 2002). Lemkin pressured international leaders to create 
a document that not only reflected the horrors of genocide but that bound political leaders to act 
when genocide was occurring (Power 2002). The United Nations finally reached an agreement 
and the result was the creation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of The 
Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations in 1951 and considered in force in 1951. 
Although the Convention was considered in force in 1951, it was not ratified by the 
United States until 1988. Politicians in the United States had a problem with the vague 
terminology and the implications of signing a document that accepted the violation of 
sovereignty to prevent genocide (Kampmark 2005; Rusk 1950). One of the major problems for 
the United States was the idea that by signing an international document, it would be forfeiting 
its rights to determine when and where action would be undertaken by the United States. Even 
though the United States expressed its reservations to the Genocide Convention, once it signed 
the Convention, as a major power and signatory, the United States has an obligation to respond 
to genocide in a way that ensures the rapid end to the violence.  
 
Defining Evil: The Meaning of Genocide 
Article Two of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national 
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing Members of the Group 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part 
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
The definition of genocide distinguishes genocide from other atrocious but less brutal 
acts, such as mass murder and crimes against humanity. Genocide has not been uncommon since 
the end of World War Two. It has occurred in nine countries, including Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Guatemala, Nigeria, Iraq, Burundi, East Pakistan and is currently occurring in Darfur, 
Sudan.  The death toll has reached easily into the millions and with countless more people 
displaced from their homelands as a result of the violence (Prevent Genocide International). It is 
clear that the Genocide Convention has not achieved the goals of preventing genocide for which 
it was originally created.  Furthermore, the Convention is also weak in its ability to punish 
perpetrators, although it has made some headway through the trials for Rwanda and Bosnia 
within international courts.  
The table below categorizes the different occurrences of genocide since the creation of 
the Genocide Convention in 1951. As demonstrated below, the international community has 
rarely used preventive measures to stop genocide and the use of the Convention to punish 
perpetrators has been irregular. The only case that had some sort of preventive measures 
associated with the Convention is Bosnia, and the case of Bosnia can actually be separated into 
two distinct periods involving different types of responses (labeled as Bosnia I to signify a lack 
of response and Bosnia II to signify the period when the United States became heavily involved). 
As demonstrated below, the record of prevention of genocide, even in the existence of the 
Genocide Convention, is poor. 
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Table One: Genocide and the International Response 
 Prevent Punish 
East Pakistan (1971) -- -- 
Burundi (1972) -- -- 
Cambodia (1975-1979) -- -- 
Nigeria (1967-1970) -- -- 
Guatemala (1981-1983) -- -- 
Iraq (1987-1989) -- +/-- 
Bosnia I (1992-1994) +/-- + 
Bosnia II (1994-1995) + + 
Rwanda (1994) -- + 
Sudan (2003-2007*) -- * 
 + Signifies the Genocide was stopped with the use of force 
-- Signifies the Convention has been ignored or ineffectively used 
+/- Signifies the response has been mixed;  
*Signifies the genocide is still occurring  
 
Although it is clear that the Genocide Convention fails on both parts of the prevent and 
punish clause, it is more important to note how it fails as a way to prevent genocide. Preventing 
genocide before it becomes catastrophic is preferable to punishing perpetrators after the fact, 
especially in light of the fact that early prevention can help save countless lives and stem the 
amount of destruction. As a result, this paper will focus specifically on the failure of the 
Genocide Convention to get signing states to prevent genocide.  
 
Literature Review 
The literature covering the Genocide Convention fails to adequately explain why 
signatories have been reluctant to fulfill their obligations to prevent genocide (Power 2002; 
Miraglia 2005; Rosen 1999; Totten & Bartrop 2004). The literature has instead focused on topics 
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such as the ratification of the treaty and the application of the punishment clause of the 
Convention. Although there is a large gap in the literature on the Genocide Convention, the 
literatures on collective security and hegemony fill the gap to explain the failure of the Genocide 
convention. The combination of the literature on collective security and hegemony creates a 
strong theoretical basis for the explanation of the recurrence of genocide in the post World War 
Two period and will be further explored in the first sections of the literature review. Then the 
focus will be turned to the various factors that affect the response to genocide, such as the lack of 
a preponderance of power, a lack of shared vision, a lack of interest in responding to genocide in 
areas that are not strategically important, problems associated with free-riding, and the lack of a 
willing hegemon. 
 In order to understand how the Genocide Convention has failed, it is useful to first 
categorize it as a form of collective security. Both collective security and the Genocide 
Convention have the common goal of preventing hostile behavior (war or genocide, respectively) 
by creating a system in which an aggressor state sees more costs than benefits in creating 
instability. It is helpful to understand the Genocide Convention as a form of collective security 
because of the requirement to prevent and punish genocide and the implications of this 
requirement for the international community. This section of the literature review will focus on 
situating the Genocide Convention within the collective security literature. Then the section will 
examine various explanations for the failure of the Genocide Convention derived from collective 
security and other literatures. 
 In the most basic terms, collective security is a system where a group of nations agree 
that an attack on one state in the system is the equivalent of an attack on all (Kupchan and 
Kupchan 1991). As a result, if there is an attack on one state in the system, the other members of 
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the international community are expected to retaliate against the aggressor as if they themselves 
had been attacked (Mearsheimer 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). However, the purpose of 
collective security is to use regimes and institutions to respond to a system of instability 
(Mearsheimer 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Claude 1962). Inis Claude calls collective 
security a “scheme designed to accomplish the effective management of power relations among 
states” and it is through this scheme that the management of power allows for a more stable, 
peaceful system to emerge (Claude 1962).  
Like collective security systems, the Genocide Convention is a security regime because 
its focus is on the management of genocide by requiring the signatories to respond to the 
perpetrators by stopping the genocide. The purpose of the Genocide Convention is to discourage 
genocide by warning perpetrators of the consequences before they act, or at least to make the 
perpetrators expect a response to the genocide to make it end quickly. The preventive capabilities 
of a security regime, particularly the Genocide Convention, should ideally create an atmosphere 
where genocide does not occur because of the potential magnitude of the consequences. The 
Genocide Convention, although established as a security regime, has failed to prevent genocide 
because of a variety of factors. I will now turn my attention to the factors affecting the response 
to genocide and theorize which factor promotes the most significant hypothesis to test. 
 
Factors Affecting the Response to Genocide 
A collective security arrangement is meant to create the “principles, norms, and rules that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate” (Jervis 
2001). In order to create the principles, rules and norms to respond to aggressive nations, a 
collective security arrangement, such as the Genocide Convention, needs to be created to account 
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for the various factors that may affect its effectiveness. The first factor that may affect the 
response of the members to an aggressor is the lack of a preponderance of power from the states 
forming the arrangement. If one of the goals of collective security is to “prevent war by 
providing a deterrent to aggression”, there cannot be any power greater than the coalition that 
would not be deterred by its size, force, and power (Thompson 1953). This “preponderance of 
power” is absolutely necessary for a collective security system to work; otherwise there would be 
no effective deterrence towards states that are taking actions that would violate international 
norms (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991; Thompson 1953; Betts 1992). Although preponderance of 
power is an important factor, it is important to distinguish between the existence of 
preponderance of power and the willingness to use it. 
Although a preponderance of power might exist in the international community, meaning 
there might be more powerful nations or a more powerful combination of nations who have the 
ability to stop genocide in a country, there also has to be the threat of the use of the power. If 
there is no threat that the international community will respond with enough force to stop the 
genocide, there is no real threat of preponderance of power. The use of the preponderance of 
power will rest on the willingness of the states to use it. If there is a preponderance of power 
available, but the states maintaining the preponderance of power are unwilling to commit the 
resources to provide it, there is still a lack of preponderance of power. At what point do countries 
find the political will to use the power available to respond to genocide? 
Another factor that will affect the effectiveness of a collective security arrangement is the 
lack of interest for a country to respond to genocide. Although a country may want to prevent 
genocide and may even have the ability to do so, other factors may shape their immediate 
interest and stop them from undertaking the necessary actions to prevent genocide. For example, 
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if a country is already involved in military actions at the time of the genocide, they will be less 
likely to expend resources to prevent genocide. This would mean that although the resources are 
available to respond to both the genocide and remain involved in the military actions in other 
places, there is a lack of political will to involve the country in multiple military conflicts. A 
country may have the ability to respond to genocide, but the interest of the country may be based 
on the political will of the leaders, the domestic support of the country, or the strategic 
interest/importance of the country for the international system.  
In terms of institutional factors that may affect the response of the international 
community to genocide, there are two major impediments to consider. The first is the 
institutional structure of the United Nations Security Council and the ability of the members to 
veto proposed legislation and therefore prevent any action from taking place. The veto power can 
create a big impediment to collective action, particularly when the major powers do not support a 
reaction to genocide when it is occurring and do not see the benefits in bearing the costs. The 
veto power can also demonstrate to the international community, and in particular, the 
perpetrators of genocide, that the major powers are not interested in the plight of the victims and 
the genocide can continue. The veto power gives major powers the ability to withhold resources 
and prevent action, thereby keeping the major powers safely removed from the conflict. The 
members of the Security Council can determine what course of action will be pursued in the 
United Nations and withhold or grant the use of UN resources to prevent genocide, a factor that 
could change the course of genocide. 
The second institutional factor to consider is the lack of enforcement mechanisms for 
failing to honor the commitment to the Genocide Convention also stands as an institutional 
problem with the Genocide Convention that fails to encourage member states to prevent 
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genocide even when action is not in their immediate interest. Without an enforcement clause 
attached to the Genocide Convention, there is no punishment for states that fail to uphold the 
obligations outlined in the Convention. Without the enforcement clause, there is no way to 
ensure compliance with the Convention and no repercussions for inaction. The institutional 
problems with the Genocide Convention and the impact on the response to genocide are 
necessary factors to consider when considering the failure of the Genocide Convention. 
A hegemon is defined as the single dominant power of the international system, such as 
the United States after the Cold War. The role of the hegemon in the international system is often 
to promote cooperation and, as part of a unipolar system, is often expected to be the “stabilizer” 
(Kindleberger 1973). It is also well known that the role of the hegemon in international regimes 
is often to provide what are considered “public goods” (Snidal 1985; Moravcsik 2000). 
However, for the hegemon to have a desire to provide the public goods on behalf of the 
international community, it has to be “willing to bear the full costs of its provision” (Snidal 
1985). The role of the hegemon may have a large impact on whether or not genocide can and 
will be stopped. If the hegemon is unwilling to bear the costs of the response, then action will be 
unlikely. The potential for a hegemon to assume the leadership position in the response to 
genocide could have the most impact on the response of the rest of the international community. 
Without the resources of the hegemon, the rest of the countries may want to act but not have the 
resources and power necessary to be successful. When the hegemon acts, the rest of the 
international community sees it is willing to bear the majority of the costs, and other states can 
get involved to provide support that would have been insufficient without the hegemon. 
Although all of these factors are important in their capacity to affect the response to genocide as 
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set out in the Genocide Convention, the role of the hegemon is in many ways one of the most 
interesting. 
 The role of the hegemon in the international system is often to stabilize international 
politics and to promote cooperation. With regards to human rights regimes however, the role of 
the hegemon is debated. Roger K. Smith argues that when viewing the role of the hegemon 
through the lens of regime theory, the typical view that the hegemon is an exploiter of the 
international system is turned into the view that the hegemon is able to promote and sustain 
regimes (Smith 1987). Other theorists view the role of the hegemon as a potentially important, 
especially with the idea that human rights regimes have a moral underpinning. If the hegemon 
decides to wield its power on the basis of a moral obligation to human rights, it can be 
“unusually effective” (Donnelly 1986). With regards to the Genocide Convention, the role of the 
hegemon can fulfill either path. The hegemon could ignore and discourage the fulfillment of the 
Genocide Convention, or it could be its greatest champion, encouraging cooperation from the 
rest of the signatories and fulfilling a moral responsibility. The involvement of the hegemon 
might be important because of its unique capability to promote action, bear the brunt of action, 
and coordinate the action and lend its resources. 
There is also the impediment of countries that free ride when action is necessary and 
“produce a weaker opposing coalition by contributing to the underproduction of military 
capability” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995, 56). Free riding occurs when countries take more than 
their share of the benefits of action, while contributing less than the other countries. Essentially, 
free riding countries get the benefits without contributing to the costs. Countries wait to see the 
reaction of the rest of the international community, particularly the major powers, before they 
commit to intervention. As a result, the major powers do not wish to bear the costs of the 
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intervention and the smaller powers wait to respond to the genocide, thereby allowing the 
genocide to occur and action to be stalled. There is also the problem of other major powers free 
riding on the power, commitment, and expenses of the hegemon while contributing little of their 
own resources. The presence of a hegemon can alleviate many of these fears by providing a 
single state that has “sufficient interest in the [public] good to be willing to bear the costs of its 
provision” (Snidal 1985). The hegemon can help to alleviate the free riding problem by using its 
power and resources to bear the costs of the intervention and allow the smaller powers to 
contribute the resources they do have and encouraging the participation of the rest of the 
international community. 
 
Focusing on the Leadership of the Hegemon 
 Although each factor affecting the response of nations involved in a collective security 
regime represents a possible determinant to the success of the Genocide Convention, there is one 
major factor that stands out above the rest. The hegemon has an important role to play in the 
implementation and effectiveness of regimes (Moravcsik 2000; Kindleberger 1973; Keohane 
1980). Although the United States did not play a major role in the creation of the Genocide 
Convention after World War Two, the ratification of the Genocide Convention by the hegemon 
at the end of the Cold War meant the United States was now also subject to the rules of the 
Convention. However, the United States and the major powers have not always sustained the 
Genocide Convention and have instead often let genocide occur without taking or promoting any 
preventive action. The importance of the United States in promoting preventive action towards 
genocide is an avenue that needs to be explored further. This thesis will focus specifically on the 
role of the hegemon and the impact of a willing hegemon to prevent genocide. 
13 
 
 
Hypothesis:  
I hypothesize that the Genocide Convention is likely to be ineffective in the absence of a 
willing hegemon that encourages the rest of international community to stop genocide where it is 
occurring.  My independent variable is the willingness and ability of the hegemon to respond to 
genocide. My dependent variable is the cessation of genocide based on the intervention of the 
hegemon and the international community as a whole.  
 
The Role of the United States: An Overview 
 Does the presence of a willing hegemon make a difference in the reaction to genocide? 
Based on the genocides that have occurred since the end of World War Two, it is clear that a 
successful response to genocide has not occurred without the presence of a willing hegemon. It is 
important to note that it is not solely the presence of a hegemon in the international system that 
would be sufficient for response to genocide, but rather that the key is the willingness of the 
hegemon to be involved in a response. It is easiest to summarize this idea in a matrix 
demonstrating that the presence of a hegemon was not the deciding factor in preventing 
genocide, but that the presence of a willing hegemon is necessary for any response to genocide to 
occur. Based on the table below, it is clear that without a hegemon present there has been no case 
of preventive action. The presence of the hegemon indicates that there was one country 
recognized as the hegemon of the international system and a party to the Genocide Convention, a 
factor not present until the end of the Cold War, with the United States assuming hegemony. 
Therefore, hegemon in the table refers specifically to the United States. Preventive action 
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indicates that there was enough force to stop the genocide at any stage of the process, even if the 
genocide had been occurring for years.  
Table Two: Preventive Action with Presence of Hegemon 
Hegemon 
Present? 
Yes (Post Cold War) No (Cold War) 
 
BOSNIA II 
 
No case of preventive action without 
presence of hegemon 
Y
es                              N
o             
  PR
EV
EN
TIV
E A
C
TIO
N
 
TA
K
EN
? 
SUDAN 
 
BOSNIA I 
 
IRAQ 
 
RWANDA 
CAMBODIA 
 
NIGERIA 
 
GUATEMALA 
 
EAST PAKISTAN 
 
BURUNDI 
 
Case Selection and Methodology 
In order to test the theory that a willing hegemon can change the course of a genocide, I 
will focus the rest of this thesis on the post Cold War cases of genocide, specifically Rwanda and 
Bosnia. These two cases represent the most fruitful cases of post Cold War response for several 
reasons. Primarily, they represent the best cases to fulfill the condition of the presence of a 
hegemon, especially since they represent a time period where the Soviet Union was clearly no 
longer a threat to the United States and as a result the United States was the hegemon. Although 
the United States continuously gained more power throughout the end of the Cold War period, 
the post Cold War period represents a time when the United States filled the role of hegemon 
without the threat of another powerful country to its hegemonic position. Both cases occurred 
within the same time period (early 1990s) and the basic characteristics of the international 
system did not change drastically within the year between the two occurrences of genocide. 
Therefore, I will be able to use these cases while controlling for other variables, such as different 
15 
 
leaders, time periods, or international events. These two cases also allow me to examine two 
different responses to genocide. Although the response to genocide in Bosnia was late, it was 
drastically stronger than the non-response to the genocide in Rwanda. Compared to all of the 
other cases of genocide, these two post Cold War cases are the best way to test the theory with 
the ability to see the two different responses to genocide (whereas almost every other case of 
genocide, both pre and post Cold War, was met with a strong lack of response).  
Although the cases of Sudan and Iraq also occurred after the Cold War, the genocide in 
Sudan is still occurring and until the cessation of hostilities in Sudan, it would not represent a 
strong case study for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, the genocide in Sudan will not be 
considered as a case study, but should be looked into for further studies on genocide once the 
genocide in Sudan has stopped. The genocide in Iraq would also be an interesting case to study; 
However, the similar times period, history, and political background of the Rwanda and Bosnia 
cases makes them the best choices to study. Rwanda and Bosnia represent the two most similar 
cases to examine and will provide the most fruitful plausibility probe inquiry into a deeper study 
of genocide and the role of the hegemon. Finally the comparison of Rwanda and Bosnia I with 
Bosnia II represent two very different responses and the ability to demonstrate that with the 
involvement of the United States in Bosnia II, the course of the genocide was drastically changed 
and the result was an end to genocide. The final case to address is that of Cambodia and the role 
of Vietnam. Although an argument can be made that Vietnam intervened in Cambodia and the 
result was the end of genocide, I am not considering Cambodia as a case to study. The military 
action Vietnam undertook towards Cambodia overthrew the political system in the country and 
then set up a puppet government in the country, and as a result the genocide was stopped. The 
intervention in Bosnia II was not to overthrow the government with the intent of installing a 
16 
 
puppet government, but instead was to stop the genocide. This is an important distinction to 
make, especially since the genocide in Cambodia represents a case during a bipolar system of 
power.  
In order to sufficiently test the hypothesis, this study will use Eckstein’s methodology of 
a plausibility probe to determine whether or not a more rigorous, comparative study of the 
genocides will be fruitful. A plausibility probe is a method used to examine whether the theory 
will be strong enough to be tested with even broader, more in-depth inquiries (Eckstein 1975). 
The method to study a plausibility probe is to use case studies that are “rooted in data and 
reasoning to warrant their statement in more precise form and their thorough testing” (Eckstein 
1975). The purpose is to “establish the validity of the central propositions” for further inquiry 
(Eckstein 1975). In examining the response of the hegemon to genocide by using a plausibility 
probe, I hope to determine whether a stronger, more in-depth approach to the research question 
would be beneficial for the field of political science.  
 I plan to examine the case studies using secondary sources, with particular attention to 
summaries and comments on the resolutions and documents passed by both the United Nations 
and the United States. I will also use quotes and summaries of major politicians from personal 
biographies of the politicians as well as secondary sources that have summarized the quotes and 
speeches of the politicians. In addition to the use of quotes and speeches of politicians, I will also 
use the secondary sources for the most accurate summaries of the response of the international 
community and the United States to genocide. I plan to use secondary sources primarily because 
the wealth of information on both Rwanda and Bosnia represents a beneficial area to examine the 
role of the United States with regards to genocide in these two countries.  
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Evaluating the Response: Rwanda 
The genocide in Rwanda represents one of the most horrific massacres in a very short 
period of time. In the span of one hundred days, the militias promoted by the Hutu-dominated 
government massacred almost 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu moderates. As the genocide in Rwanda 
continued on, the United States and the rest of the Western world refused to become involved 
and the perpetrators continued to slaughter without fear of repercussions. In evaluating the 
response to Rwanda, we see that the United States followed a certain pattern in its response: (1) 
it attempted to avoid using the term genocide to avoid obligations to respond; (2) the United 
States urged the Western world, through mediums such as the United Nations, to withdraw its 
support. The rest of this section will give a brief summary of the genocide in Rwanda, discuss 
the patterns of the response of the international community and the United States, and throughout 
the section will examine the role of the United States in not responding to the genocide. 
The genocide that occurred in Rwanda is relatively well known, however, a brief 
summary will help to give a basic background to the case study. Rwanda consists of two main 
ethnic groups, the Hutus, making up about 85% of the population and the Tutsis, which are about 
15% of the population (CIA World Factbook). Historically, the ethnic tensions between the 
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda were deeply ingrained and society was divided along these lines. 
During the colonial rule by the Belgians, the Tutsis held the power within the system of 
government (Paris 2004). The tensions between the Tutsis and Hutus were already in existence 
but, “Belgian rule appears to have exacerbated differences and destroyed the cushions that had 
made the prevailing hierarchy tolerable” (Marchak 2003). In the mid-1950s, the Hutus were 
gradually given more power and subsequent violence began to occur against the Tutsis. As a 
result, waves of Tutsis fled into exile and tensions continued to flare, especially as the exiled 
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Tutsis began to build a revolutionary military force to attempt to win back power. When 
independence from Belgium was granted in 1962, the Hutus solidified their place as the ruling 
class in Rwanda. From 1962 to the early 1990s, the Hutus used their positions to marginalize the 
Tutsis and the Tutsis in exile continued to build their military force. The culmination of these 
events was a civil war that began in 1990, tearing the country apart and enflaming already 
existing conflicts. A cease-fire was reach in 1993, with the help of the United Nations, and 
negotiations were underway (Power 2002).  However, the negotiations were facing many 
obstacles and the success of the peace process was mixed. When the plane of Rwandan President 
Habyarimana was shot down in 1994, any hope for the success of a peace process disintegrated 
and the genocide began to unfold. The genocide resulted in the death of 500,000 to one million 
Rwandan Tutsis and Hutu moderates (Stanton 2004). Where was the international community 
during the Rwandan genocide and why did the international actors not follow through with their 
obligations as set out in the Genocide Convention? 
 
Pre-Genocide Rwanda and the International Community 
Several major powers were involved in Rwanda throughout the civil war and were 
instrumental in the peace process and the Arusha peace agreement, which served as a temporary 
hold on hostilities still fermenting (Prunier 1995). The international community had been 
instrumental in pressuring Rwandan President Habyarimana to accept the Arusha peace 
agreement and the world hoped the cease-fire agreement would be enough to end the hostilities 
(Destexhe 1995). The United Nations was also heavily involved at this point, and had agreed to 
supply a “neutral military monitoring force” to sustain the Arusha agreement. The deployment of 
this new monitoring force created the new United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda 
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(UNAMIR). Although the idea behind the monitoring force was to reinforce the peace process 
and to assist the country in rebuilding, it lacked the support from the United Nations necessary to 
make it a functioning entity in the face of mounting violence (Jones 1996). UNAMIR became the 
model of initial reluctance that shaped the response of the international community for the rest of 
the conflict (Jones 1996). 
In addition to the United Nations, France played an important role in the genocide. The 
French had been involved in Rwanda long before the hostilities had flared to the point of 
genocide. Beginning with the dictatorship of President Habyarimana in 1975, the French 
supplied military and financial aid, slowly edging out the role of Belgium as the former colonial 
ruler (Melvern 2000). When the Rwandan Patriotic Front returned to Rwanda from Uganda and 
started the civil war, France sent in troops to stand by the Rwandan government forces to fight 
(Melvern 2000). Even though officially the French troops were not to use force, the French 
government was running the counter-insurgency campaign for the Rwandan government 
(Melvern 2000). Although the French had the resources to stop the genocide, they did not. 
Instead, the French supported the Hutu government and allowed the genocide to continue. The 
role of the United States in this situation should have been to encourage the French to stop the 
genocide and remove its support for the Hutu government. The French were not weak in their 
ability to stop the genocide, but they lacked the political will to stop the genocide (whereas the 
will existed to help secure the investment France had made in the Hutu government). The role of 
the United States is not always to provide solely the power and resources, but also to provide the 
encouragement to and direction of the missions. 
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The Response of the United States and How it Affected the International Community 
 The international community knew the situation in Rwanda was genocide, but were 
reluctant to use the term “genocide,” in order to avoid the obligation to try and stop it (LeBor 
2006). In fact, the Secretary of State for the United States, Warren Christopher, acknowledged 
the fact that “acts of genocide” had occurred based on the definition given in the Genocide 
Convention, but he would not directly state that genocide had occurred. Other officials, such as 
the State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley, stated “genocide has a very precise legal 
meaning…I’m not able to look at all of those criteria at this moment and say yes, no” (Cohen 
2007). This statement came after multiple nongovernmental organizations had already identified 
what was occurring as genocide, including the Red Cross, Oxfam, Time and Human Rights 
Watch (Cohen 2007). By avoiding the use of the term “genocide” the United States was able to 
shy away from the obligations to prevent any further devastation (Ferrogiarro 2001; Donaghue 
1994; Christopher 1994). By avoiding the use of the word “genocide,” the United States could 
also avoid any obligations to encourage the rest of the international community to become 
involved in an intervention. 
The initial response to the genocide from the international community was discouraging 
to the victims, with the international community relinquishing responsibility for responding to 
the genocide. The first UN response to the genocide was to pass Resolution 912, reducing the 
UNAMIR force from 2,500 to 270 (Destexhe 1994). This response was primarily encouraged by 
the United States (Ferroggiaro 2001; Power 2002). General Romeo Dallaire, the former UN 
Commander in Kigali, has been quoted as saying “The day all that started, the US said not only 
are we not getting involved, we are not going to support anyone else getting involved” 
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(Amanpour 2004). As a result, the hegemon discouraged action by the international community 
and shaped the response to the genocide. The final intervention proposal presented to the 
Security Council on April 13th failed to receive any support, mostly because of the intense 
lobbying of the United States government to remove it from consideration (Cohen 2007). In 
addition to politicking at the United Nations, the United States also immediately stated its lack of 
interest in wars that were based on ethnic divisions to which it had little knowledge of or interest 
in (LeBor 2006). As the genocide continued to occur and the international media continued to 
publish stories about the atrocities, the United States began to pass legislation that stated its 
position on peacekeeping operations and intent to “be more selective and effective in which 
peacekeeping operations it undertook” (Cohen 2007). These statements indicated that the United 
States did not consider the situation in Rwanda to be a peacekeeping operation worth 
considering. Even when the United States was willing to commit resources to the proposed 
missions, the bureaucracy of the American government hampered the response. For example, the 
United States was asked for armored cars to help support the limited UN mission in Rwanda. 
The United States would only let the UN use armored cars from storage and it took three weeks 
for the US State Department to begrudgingly turn over the cars to the UN Department of Legal 
Affairs (Prunier 1995). The slow response from the United States failed to encourage the 
international community to work on a response to the genocide. The lack of response from the 
international community signified a response to the perpetrators of the genocide that the violence 
could continue without fear of reprimand or intervention. The non-response was actually a very 
strong response from the international community that allowed the genocide to continue.  
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Finally a Response: Operation Turquoise 
A response finally occurred when, on May 17th , the Security Council passed a resolution 
calling for an arms embargo and deploying forces into the war zone. The resolution was drafted 
with the initial opposition of the United States, even though it had recently established the 
Rwanda Task Force as part of a Pentagon initiative (Cohen 2007). The French offered a 
humanitarian operation known as Operation Turquoise (Melvern 2000; Cohen 2007). The 
previous involvement of the French in the country was as a supporter of the Habyarimana 
government and thus made this mission a controversial one. The RPF were hostile towards the 
French mission, but the United Nations mandated the peacekeeping operation and gave them the 
authority to use force if necessary (Melvern 2000). As part of the peacekeeping operation, the 
French established safe zones for the Rwandans, regardless of their ethnic identity. As a result, 
the killings continued with the safe zones and the safe zones protected both perpetrators and 
victims of the genocide (Melvern 2000; Cohen 2007). The French Operation Turquoise failed to 
stop the genocide and in fact gave shelter to the perpetrators while inflaming tensions with the 
RPF because of the historical role of the French in the country (Cohen 2007; Melvern 2000; 
Cohen 2007). The peacekeeping operation undertook by the French and approved by the Security 
Council months after the genocide had begun failed and the genocide continued unabated. 
 
The Importance of the United States: Reluctant Hegemon 
Due to the encouragement of the United States to avoid an intervention in Rwanda, there 
was no force strong enough to prevent the genocide and as a result the loss of life was 
catastrophic. Without the pressure of the hegemon on the international community to respond to 
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the genocide, the international community did not commit itself to a response. General Dallaire 
had asked for “reinforcements and later said that with 5000 troops he could have saved 500,000 
people,” but without the support of the United States the devastation was in fact much worse 
(Destxhe 1995). Clearly, if the United States had committed troops and support to the United 
Nations military force instead of removing troops and paralyzing the United Nations, the 
response to genocide in Rwanda would have been different within the international community. 
The impact of the lack of U.S. involvement and the Clinton administration’s refusal to contribute 
anything to the missions attempting to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda made it that 
much more difficult for the international community to have an impact in stopping the genocide 
crisis in Rwanda 
Without the desire of the hegemon to bear the majority of the costs of the intervention in 
Rwanda, the rest of the international community failed to act as well. They did so because the 
United States “is the only country that has the political, economic, and military strength to lead 
an effective intervention in crises of such scale” (Destexhe 1994). The United States as the 
hegemon had the ability to lead the intervention in Rwanda and to stop the genocide, but it failed 
to fulfill that role. Not only did the international community fail to prevent genocide militarily, 
but they also failed to find alternate ways of dealing with the atrocities and instead stuck to 
“diplomatic niceties and neutrality, and shipping humanitarian aid” (Destexhe 1995). As the 
hegemon, the United States often had to face the consequences from whatever course of action it 
chose to take. With regards to Rwanda, the United States would either respond to the genocide 
and commit its resources or ignore the genocide and refuse any commitment. Therefore, the 
United States had to face two potential outcomes if it decided to become involved: “the 
authorization of a new UN force and a new mandate without the means to implement either; and 
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worse, the very real possibility of the U.S. having to bail out a failed UN mission” (Ferroggiaro 
2004). In the end, the truth of the matter is that the United States had every ability to understand 
and respond to the genocide in Rwanda, but as Samantha Power notes: “any failure to fully 
appreciate the genocide stemmed from political, moral, and imaginative weaknesses, not 
informational ones” (Power 2002). The United States was told during a meeting between UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Ambassador Madeline Albright that “forces for 
Rwanda would be available if the U.S. could make a ‘substantial contribution” to a special 
peacekeeping fund for Rwanda” (Ferroggiaro 2004). The United States, as a hegemonic power in 
the international system, was expected to not only honor its commitment to the Genocide 
Convention, but also to lead the rest of the international community to respond to the crisis in 
Rwanda. 
Why did the United States spend so much energy refusing to get involved in the genocide 
in Rwanda? The biggest reason explored in the literature and recognized by policy leaders was 
the fiasco in Somalia, where American soldiers were ambushed and dragged through the streets, 
all the while being broadcast on international news networks (Prunier 1995). The result was the 
lack of both domestic support and interest from the United States to get involved in Rwanda, if 
only to prevent another Somalia from occurring. In addition, a fact that Madeline Albright has 
pointed out, the United States was already involved in crises elsewhere, including Haiti and 
Bosnia (LeBor 2006; Albright 2004). The United States also knew that if it were to commit itself 
to a response to the genocide, it would end up bearing the costs of the intervention and the 
United States did not see the benefits to such action (LeBor 2006). The political will from the 
United States was clearly lacking, determined by factors such as the recent crisis in Somalia and 
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the lack of desire to organize the rest of the international community (LeBor 2006; Albright 
2004). 
The role of the United States as the hegemon during the genocide in Rwanda is clear. 
Without the assistance and support of the United States, the United Nations was unable to 
respond to the genocide because it was lacking the power and capability from the major power 
and, as a result, was also lacking the resources from the rest of the international community. The 
United States “as the lone superpower today, cannot escape the accompanying moral and 
political obligation to deal with a genocide” (Destexhe 1994). As the United States continuously 
blocked UN resolutions and dragged its feet on a response to the genocide, the rest of the 
international community followed its lead (Prunier 1995; Destexhe 1994). The combination of a 
lack of interest from the United States as well as the general lack of interest in the international 
community meant the potential for a response to genocide in Rwanda was minimal. Even though 
the United States, France, Britain and China had plenty of power to easily deploy military troops 
or use air strikes early in the conflicts/genocide to stop the perpetrators before the genocides 
reached the extent they did, they failed to do so (Prunier 1995). Genocide in Rwanda continued 
as the world stood by. 
The conflict finally resolved itself when the Rwandan Patriotic Front consolidated power 
in Rwanda and was able to stop the genocide. After 100 days of fighting, the end result of the 
genocide was over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus dead. The international community had 
failed to respond to one of the worst genocides since World War Two. In a United Nations report 
published in 1999, the United States and other major world powers are condemned for “ignoring 
evidence of the genocide and removing UN staff when the victims needed help the most” (UN 
Report 1999). 
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Evaluating the Response: Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Whereas the genocide in Rwanda was met with a complete lack of action, the genocide in 
Bosnia was met with a wide range of responses compared to all other cases of genocide. The 
case of Bosnia shows that when the United States was reluctant to become involved in genocide, 
the pattern followed was similar to that of Rwanda. First, there was a debate on whether or not 
the actions constituted genocide and reluctance to use the word and then there was an 
abandonment of the region by the United Nations and the rest of the international community. 
However, once the United States became involved in the response to the genocide, the response 
was drastically different. The genocide stopped and the warring parties were able to come to an 
agreement to end the civil war. This case study will be constructed somewhat differently than 
that of Rwanda because of the two phases of the response. The first section will discuss the 
history of the genocide. The second section will look at Bosnia before the intervention of the 
United States, from the years of 1992-1994, also known as Bosnia I. The third section will look 
at the course of the genocide after the United States followed intervention policies and will 
discuss the reasons for the changing response of the United States, from 1994-1995, labeled as 
Bosnia II. 
Similar to the genocide in Rwanda, the genocide in Bosnia was the end result of years of 
civil war. The breakup of Yugoslavia exposed many issues, especially as political crises began to 
give rise to extremist and secessionist groups. In addition to the problems within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, there was civil war and ethnic conflict in the surrounding regions, including 
Croatia. The United Nations had established a peacekeeping force in Croatia to deal with the 
ethnic conflicts that were already present in the region but that continued to spill over and 
become more extreme as the peace process dragged on. The United States was working within 
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Croatia during the conflict, transferring weapons through Muslim countries to the Croatian army 
(LeBor 2006). The case of Croatia shows that the United Nations and the United States were 
already involved in the region when the Bosnia conflict began to escalate, and were well aware 
of the impending genocide.  
The ethnic breakdown of Bosnia is divided into three groups: Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks 
(Bosnian Muslims). The civil war in Bosnia was a response to the breakup of the Soviet Union 
and the power struggle among the ethnic divisions. Elections within the region threatened the 
Bosnian Serbs, since the Serbs felt the elections failed to represent their interest in a “Greater 
Serbia” championed by Slobodan Milosevic (LeBor 2006). The main conflicts began to arise as 
the Serbs began to boycott the referendums, fearing that the vote would give power to the other 
two ethnic groups and cause the Serbs to be constantly outvoted by ethnic lines as opposed to 
political lines (Economides and Taylor 1996). Although the “ethnic cleansing” of the Bosniaks 
occurred throughout the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the most well known episodes of 
genocide in Bosnia were largely carried out in the Muslim enclaves (and UN protected “safe 
areas”), the most famous known as Srebrenica. Even though the United Nations and the rest of 
the international community had been involved with the peace accords up to this point, there was 
little to no response at the outset of the genocide. Again, the international community attempted 
to help with the peace process during the civil wars, but claimed their ability to help was limited 
because these were “ethnic wars” that the Western world could know and do little about (LeBor 
2006; Henriksen 1996). It was best to just let these factions settle the problems amongst 
themselves and the international community was limited to stop them.  
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Bosnia I: Non-Intervention Policies 
The response to the genocide in Bosnia was drastically different between when the 
United States was noncommittal in responding to genocide and when it finally agreed to 
intervention and to take the lead in the response. The beginning of the response of the United 
States started during the term of President George H.W. Bush, who had followed a policy of 
non-intervention to deal with the conflict. During his presidential campaign, President Clinton 
had made it clear that he wanted to make Bosnia a part of his foreign policy agenda and 
criticized the policies of President Bush (Henriksen 1996; Clinton 2004). Up until this point and 
during the first few months of President Clinton’s administration, the United States fulfilled 
humanitarian roles, such as airdropping relief supplies (Henriksen 1996; House Document 
Communication 3732, 1994). However, because of the involvement of the United States in the 
Gulf crisis, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council decided to let the rest 
of Europe take a firm lead in responding to the crisis (Economides and Taylor 1996). From the 
beginning, the Western world was disinterested in the conflict in Bosnia and the perpetrators 
recognized that the Western world had little desire to get involved.  
At the outset of the genocide in Bosnia, the United States followed many of the same 
patterns found in the case of Rwanda. Political leaders in the United States were hesitant to use 
the word genocide, and instead used words such as “ethnic cleansing” (LeBor 2006). They 
characterized the war as one of “ancient hatreds” and as a result stood idly by as the atrocities 
occurred. The result was the escalation of the conflict into genocide as the international 
community debated on what should be the best course of action. In addition to not labeling what 
was occurring as genocide, the United Nations and the international community tried to paint the 
conflict as one in which both sides of the conflict shared responsibility for the atrocities and that 
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genocide was occurring from both sides, not just one (LeBor 2006; Cushman and Mestrovic 
1996). The United States responded to the atrocities by claiming, “no party is blameless for the 
current situation,” a quote made by the Department of State spokeswoman Margaret D. Tutwiler 
(Cushman and Mestrovic 1996). As a result of the noncommittal response of the Untied States to 
identify the situation in Bosnia as genocide, the international community could also refuse to 
acknowledge the truth of what was occurring and instead commit the minimal amount of troops 
or aide necessary to appear to be interested.  
The United States was once again expected to be the leader in responding to the genocide 
occurring in Bosnia. From the beginning, the United States decided that the response of the 
international community in Bosnia would be noncommittal and the Serbs in Bosnia recognized 
this. Early responses to the genocide included sanctions, small troop deployments, and 
humanitarian efforts. The United Nations and the United States had established arms embargos 
and economic sanctions, which in fact hurt the Bosnian Muslims more than the Serbs (Daalder 
2000; Henriksen 1996). The French and British deployed troops to calm the fighting, but the 
troops were there to avoid war with the Serbs and act as an “alibi for not taking more robust 
action against the Serbs” (LeBor 2006). By sending troops but not authorizing them to use force, 
the international community could say it was involved without providing the actual support to 
discourage the genocide. The humanitarian efforts did not have enough support on the ground to 
get the supplies to the necessary locations, regardless of Resolutions 770 and 771, which were 
passed at the United Nations and designed to ensure the humanitarian aide (LeBor 2006). The 
initial reactions to the crisis in Bosnia and the limited commitment to deployments and the use of 
force sent a clear message to the perpetrators that the international community would not get 
involved.  
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In order to avoid military involvement with the genocide, in Bosnia, the United States 
pursued non-military action. By pursuing non-military action, the United States could avoid 
fulfilling its obligation to respond to the genocide effectively and instead find policies that kept 
the United States above criticism of inaction. During the initial phase of the genocide and the 
war, the United States attempted to commit itself to non-military agendas, including embargos 
and sanctions (Daalder 2000). Additionally, the United States offered policies that conflicted 
with the policies offered by the European Community and therefore it was difficult to find a 
compromise (Daalder 2000; LeBor 2006). The United States supported a “lift and strike” 
approach to the crisis, where the embargo would be lifted so Bosnia could defend itself and 
NATO would sponsor air strikes against the Serbs (LeBor 2006). Although the United States 
tried to negotiate a “lift and strike” plan with its NATO allies, they could not come to an 
agreement. Germany was “sympathetic” while Britain and France did not agree with the air 
strikes because it could put their ground troops at risk (Sharp 1998; LeBor 2006). The United 
States continued to offer policies that differed from the rest of Europe and more often than not, 
“relinquished another opportunity to assume a leadership role” by allowing the Europeans to 
“prevail in preserving their cautious, go-slow approach while innocents died” (Henriksen 1996).  
As the conflicts continued on in the region, the United States began to waver in its own 
policies, including the initial idea of  “lift and strike.” President Clinton read a novel, Balkan 
Ghosts, which served to convince him that the “conflict in the Balkans was inevitable” and 
therefore not worth pursuing (Sharp 1998). The policy of the United States shifted from limited 
involvement to attempts to contain the conflict and eventually to adopting the UN safe areas, or 
enclaves (Sharp 1998; Daalder 2000). However, the safe area plan limited the ability of the 
international community to respond to the genocide and in fact allowed for the Bosnian Muslims 
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to be in contained areas with little protection from the United Nations (Sharp 1998). The shift in 
policy from limited engagement to containment meant the Bosnia Serbs were given even more 
freedom to attack the Bosnian Muslims and a clear pass to continue with their aggressive actions.  
Without pressure from the United States and the United Nations, the international 
community did not feel any pressure to get involved, and thus lacked the willingness to respond. 
Bosnian Serbs knew that the UN would “return to traditional peacekeeping principles and would 
not interfere with their efforts” geared towards ethnic cleansing (Daalder 2000).  Unlike in 
Rwanda, the United States had the ability to rely on NATO as a force of support and resources in 
its attempts to stop the genocide in Bosnia. However, because NATO allies and the United 
Nations were unable to come to agreement over “when and to what extent to use force,” the 
credibility of both NATO and UN was diminished (LeBor 2006). The United States had 
supported small NATO air strikes against the Serbs, but “without serious U.S. backing, these 
assaults had been meaningless” (Sharp 1998). The lack of commitment from the United States in 
the beginning of the genocide allowed the genocide to continue while the international 
community debated the solution and offered policies that kept the world on the sidelines of the 
conflict.  
The failure of the United States and the international community stemmed partly from the 
idea that the United Nations was meant to be a neutral party to the war and to only act in “self-
defense” (LeBor 2006). The United Nations had taken a stance to “remain neutral” and work 
only as “impartial and objective” observers to limit its involvement in the intervention (LeBor 
2006). With the wavering policies of the United States and the lack of a true military force from 
the United Nations, “the Serbs always knew the United States was not committed” and the 
international community did not have the pressure to involve itself in a way that would be 
32 
 
sufficient enough to stop genocide (LeBor 2006).  As the UN protected safe areas were filled 
with Bosnian Muslims, the UN soldiers had little ability or authorization to resist attacks from 
Bosnian Serbs (Sharp 1998; LeBor 2006; Daalder 2000). The breaking point for the United 
States and the international community came when the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Muslim 
enclaves with little impunity, while the UN troops could do little but watch the massacres unfold. 
 
A Response and a Result: The United States Takes the Helm 
As the emboldened Serbs took advantage of the Muslim “safe areas,” the United States 
realized that if it failed to step in at this point, the slaughter would become worse and its policy 
of containment was no longer working. The Serbs had overrun safe areas and had entered UN 
depots with the intent of repossessing the weapons seized by UN troops and to also take UN 
peacekeepers hostage as bargaining tools (Talentino 2005). As Serbs overran the UN safe areas 
and took advantage of the weakly guarded UN depots (where confiscated Serb weapons were 
being held), the United States finally decided it was time to commit its full force to the cessation 
of the hostilities (Talentino 2005).  
The United States was the “crucial ingredient in ending the war” and finally the United 
States agreed to take the leadership role (Sharp 1998; Daalder 2000). Intense NATO air strikes 
coupled with offensive operations on the ground supported by French and British troops proved 
to be a formidable force against the Serbian armies. President Clinton’s agreement to allow 
NATO to bomb Bosnian Serb targets forced the “acceleration of the on-going Geneva talks 
between the non-combatants” (Henriksen 1996). NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force, a 
plan to use both air strikes and bombing campaigns to move the Serbs from the occupied 
territories. Operation Deliberate Force was a success in that it reduced the amount of territory the 
33 
 
Bosnian Serbs held and encouraged them to return to the bargaining table. With the renewed 
interest of the United States in the atrocities, the Bosnian Serbs no longer had the freedom to 
commit genocide and the international community had the leadership it needed to respond to 
further atrocities. 
 The United States took control of the majority of the NATO air strikes, with American 
pilots flying more than 80% of the planes (Henriksen 1996).  Operation Deliberate Force became 
the effective preponderance of power necessary to end the genocide. The United States 
spearheaded the peace process, with representatives of Muslim, Croatian and Serbian factions 
convening outside of Dayton, Ohio (Daalder 2000). The genocide in Bosnia ended with the 
leadership of the United States and its Dayton Agreement negotiator Richard Holbrooke. It is 
clear that once the United States agreed to become fully engaged in the conflict in Bosnia, the 
course of the conflict took a different route. The second phase of the Bosnian genocide 
demonstrates the crucial factor of the need of a willing hegemon to respond to genocide in a way 
that both convinces the rest of the international community to get involved as well as convinces 
the perpetrators that the rest of the world is ready to respond. 
 
Why Intervention? A Review of the Response to Bosnia 
 Why did the United States finally decide to assume the leadership role to end the conflict 
in Bosnia? What made the initial policies of non-intervention change to strong, clear attacks 
against the Serbs to stop the genocide? There are a variety of possible explanations for this 
change in reaction, including the proximity of Bosnia to Europe, the need of the United States to 
ensure the continuation of democracy in the unstable, former Communist region, and the ability 
to use NATO and the European allies for support. While these factors existed from the beginning 
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of the response, the increase in the threat from the genocide and the realization that the United 
States would lose these important factors if the genocide continued made for a change in 
response. 
The geographical proximity of Bosnia to the rest of Europe, particularly the NATO 
countries, meant the refugee flows and instability of the region could potentially spillover into 
the NATO countries and cause even more instability (Talentino 2005). As a result, the European 
allies were more willing to compromise on different tasks to attempt to end the war. In addition, 
the importance of Bosnia to the larger desires to democratize the former Communist areas and 
the need to ensure stability in the region as the young democracies were growing proved to be a 
very important point for the United States. As the recent victor of the Cold War and the triumph 
of Democracy, the United States wanted to prove the stability of democracy. Therefore, the 
United States had a vested interest in the outcome of the civil war, and this interest only grew as 
the crisis slipped from chaos to sheer pandemonium.  
As the war waged on and the media reports about genocide continued to filter out of 
Bosnia, President Clinton decided to take full advantage of the resources at his disposal, 
particularly NATO. The genocide had finally reached a point where the United States felt that 
the resources it would have to expend to stop the genocide were less important than the potential 
loss of the region to even more instability and the continuation of genocide. In contrast to 
Rwanda, the United States had the ability to draw resources from the NATO alliance to reinforce 
any military objectives it undertook. The use of NATO most certainly played a deciding factor 
not only in adding to the preponderance of power of the United States and allies, but it also 
afforded the allies an alternative to deploying the ground troops that would have been necessary 
without the NATO air strikes. The ability to draw off of NATO resources had a large impact on 
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the end of the Bosnian genocide and once the political will existed to use these resources, the 
genocide reached an ending point. 
Thankfully, the United States intervened when it did, otherwise the genocide in Bosnia 
may have lasted much longer than it did. Although the loss of life during the first three years of 
the genocide represents a disastrous time in the foreign policy of the Western world, the final 
response to the genocide in Bosnia demonstrates the power the Western world, and in particular 
the United States, can have in stopping genocide. The United States became the champion of the 
end of the Bosnian genocide and has proven its ability to stop genocide if necessary. 
 
Never Again? Final thoughts on the Genocide Convention  
 The United States had a responsibility and the resources to respond to the genocides in 
Rwanda and Bosnia. With the conclusion that the United States had the most important role in 
responding to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, it is likely that a further inquiry into the role 
of the United States in the prevention of genocide will be fruitful. Without the support of the 
United States, the international community did little to respond to the genocides. It was not until 
the United States became involved fully in the responses that the results were drastically 
different. When the United States committed its policies and power to the response to Bosnia, the 
genocide ended quickly. Without the support of the United States to end the genocide at that 
point, the genocide would have most likely continued indefinitely. On the other hand, it is highly 
likely that the genocide would have been stopped earlier had the United States resolved to 
dedicate its power to the problem at the outset.  
Although the hegemon has the responsibility to take the leadership role in responding to 
genocide, the rest of the international community has responsibilities and obligations as well. 
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The major powers can use their position to encourage the hegemon to assume the leadership 
position. The smaller powers can contribute more resources to the intervention efforts without 
the expectation to free ride on the resources of the major powers. Preventing genocide must be a 
collective effort, but the collective effort is made much more successful with the assistance of the 
hegemon. It is not solely the responsibility of the United States or the hegemon to respond to 
genocide, but the involvement of the hegemon will often change the course of the genocide. The 
United States and the other signatories to the Genocide Convention have a responsibility and an 
obligation to do all within their power to prevent genocide when it begins or to stop it as soon as 
possible.  
 With the current situation in Darfur, Sudan and the atrocities we see there in the daily 
media, it is clear that genocide is occurring. Politicians in the United States have called the 
situation genocide, including President Bush (September 9, 2004 Press Release). The response 
from the United States has been different since the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, but it still 
has not learned from its mistakes. The United States has still failed to take a truthful, powerful 
lead to the response to the genocide. Although there has been the promise of aide, UN 
peacekeepers, and military force from the African Union and others, it has not been enough to 
stop the genocide. The result is the continuation of genocide and the deterioration of the 
credibility of the United States as a moral leader in the world political system. The United States 
should commit its support early and wholeheartedly in the beginning of conflicts where genocide 
is a clear result of current animosities/conflict. Only with the support of the United States and its 
fulfillment of its leadership capabilities will the world begin to see the end of genocide. 
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